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Abstract (250 words) 
Purpose 
This project aimed to develop an EU sociotechnical systems map to represent a 
harmonised concept of operations (CONOPS) as a future development platform for 
technologies used in multi-services emergency responses to Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents 
Methodology 
AcciMaps were developed to locate where technologies are currently used, and 
opportunities for new technologies.  The AcciMaps were iteratively co-designed with 
End Users (Fire, Ambulance, Police and Military) across three EU countries (UK, 
Finland and Greece). Data were collected using document analysis and interviews 
with senior ranking (Gold or Silver Command level) representatives of the 
participating end users. 
Findings 
Despite differences in terminology and between service sectors, consensus was 
achieved for the command structures (Gold, Silver and Bronze), and Hot Zone 
responders (Specialist Blue Light Responders and Blue Light Responders). A 
Control Room was included as the communication spine. Blue Light Responder 
activities were limited by their scope of practice and available equipment, for 
example breathing apparatus. The harmonised EU AcciMap offers a high level 
sociotechnical systems map of CBRN response. Critical segments have been 
identified which offer opportunities for technology developments that can add value 
in terms of response capabilities (e.g. tag and trace). 
Originality/ Value 
A large scale major CBRN incident may need cross-border and cross-professional 
engagement where efficient interoperability is vital. This research is the first EU 
consensus of a sociotechnical system map for CONOPS. It supports future research 
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for technology development e.g. detection and decontamination equipment design 
and use, communication, diagnosis and response technologies.       
 
Key words:  (max 12) AcciMap, NATO, Human Factors, Ergonomics, Sociotechnical 
Systems, CBRN 
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Introduction 
When a mass casualty incident (MCI) related to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or 
Nuclear (CBRN) agents occurs the emergency services will react rapidly to achieve 
the core goal of saving lives (Cornish, 2007; Alexander and Klein, 2003). The 
response environment will probably be hazardous and ambiguous, with key 
information such as the cause of the incident (natural disaster, accident or terrorism), 
the contaminant (C, B, R or N), the numbers of injuries and fatalities, and the stability 
of the working situation (and risks to responders) likely to be unknown for a period of 
time. The emergency services (Fire, Police and Ambulance) will be working together 
in situations that are high risk and time critical, with different skill sets, training, and 
mental models (House et al., 2014; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008, Drabek and 
McEntire, 2002; Mendonça et al. 2007). 
Previous incidents have identified challenges for interoperability. After the London 
Bombings on 7th July 2005, the Review Committee concluded that “communications 
within and between the emergency services ‘did not stand up ... individual 
emergency service personnel could not communicate effectively, in some cases with 
each other and, in other cases, with their control rooms” (Hallett, 2011). It is 
acknowledged that different professional and international laws/regulations may lead 
to confusion and conflicts as “individual teams tend to focus on agency-specific 
behaviour, as opposed to coordinated multi-team functioning, and so collective 
interoperability is not achieved” (House et al., 2014). In large scale cross-border 
MCIs there may be greater interoperability challenges as teams are likely to be 
working with unfamiliar, or incompatible equipment, in unfamiliar locations and “there 
is a need for more effective coordination between civil protection authorities at local, 
regional and national- as well as on a cross border basis within the EU in order to 
integrate response procedures” (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2011).  
International co-operation is important for an effective response (Centre for Strategy 
and Evaluation Services, 2011) as, although “there is a low probability of these 
attacks % their impact is so high that we judge preparations must be made for them. 
As in so many other areas of this strategy those preparations must wherever 
possible be coordinated with our allies overseas” (Home Office, 2011).   
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CBRN advice for interoperability across borders is available from the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO, 2015) as a concept of operations (CONOPS) with 
guidance on procedures, capabilities and equipment. The guidelines refer to 
information gathering/assessment/dissemination, scene management, 
saving/protecting lives, and specialist support. This top-down approach to disaster 
management has been criticised by O’Brien and Read (2005), suggesting that the 
high level role of government ‘will remain largely the same’ whilst individual services 
may continue with local custom and practices, ‘getting on with the job’. There is 
advice from the UK Government that “all individuals and organisations that might 
have to respond to emergencies should be properly prepared, including having 
clarity of roles and responsibilities, specific and generic plans, and rehearsing 
response arrangements periodically” (Cabinet Office, 2010).  
It has been suggested that increasing awareness of cross-professional practices can 
improve emergency service response (Healey et al., 2009). So how can this 
interoperability be represented for cross-professional and cross-border working? 
One approach is to map the CBRN response as a sociotechnical system (STS; 
Carayon et al, 2015). This is “a set of inter-related or coupled activities or entities 
(hardware, software, buildings, spaces, communities and people) with a joint 
purpose links between the entities which may be of state, form, function and 
causation % existing within a boundary’, these will change and modify with ‘inputs 
and outputs which may connect in many-to-many mappings’ (Wilson, 2014).  
A previous systems model of CBRN response used a chronological approach 
starting with the threat then moving through the stages of prevention, preparedness, 
alerting/ early response, and remediation (Healy et al. 2009). Although this is useful 
for establishing the response phases and events, it lacks detail about specific tasks, 
relationships, technologies, decision-making and lines of communication. Other 
systems mapping methods (e.g. AcciMaps) have been used to visualise a STS as a 
hierarchy with actions and lines of communication in a vertically integrated view 
(Salmon et al, 2012). AcciMaps were originally developed to analyse STS interacting 
events and decision-making processes where there were opportunities for loss of 
control (and accidents; Branford et al., 2009).  Salmon et al (2012) commented that 
AcciMaps offer a good approach to represent organisation and individual interactions 
with multiple STS. 
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There are many technologies used in a CBRN response for command and control; to 
manage communication and coordinate efforts of the various participants of a rescue 
effort (including detection, diagnosis and decontamination), and to manage access to 
the scene and provide security.  This is a technical component of an STS which 
requires usable interfaces. In 2007, a Usability and Human Factors/Ergonomics 
(HFE) standard for medical device development was established which requires 
manufacturers to consider potential risks of system use and integration (IEC/ISO 
62366).  
This paper describes the development of a CBRN AcciMap as a STS (CONOPS) 
and future platform for development and evaluation of technology.  
Method 
The AcciMaps methodology was modified (Salmon et al, 2017) to give a prospective 
visual representation of hierarchies, actions and lines of communication. This aimed 
to develop a consensus (harmonised) cross-professional and cross-border systems 
map for communication, decision-making, authority/delegation, situational 
awareness, logistics and reporting hierarchies. 
Purposive sampling was used to recruit participants to both provide relevant 
CONOPS documents and for interviews. As the content was sensitive and 
sometimes restricted, participants were recruited through project partners in the 
(anonymised) project. Participants were required to have experience of operating at 
Silver or Gold levels of command and have worked at Bronze level (Table 1) to allow 
exportation of all levels of the STS.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
The development of the AcciMaps used an iterative qualitative approach with 
empirical data collection from document analysis and interviews. Documents, both 
open source (e.g. NATO, 2015), and restricted (if access was approved), wer  read 
to extract task and operator information. These were separated by hierarchy (Gold to 
first responder) using the themes of communication, planning, action, and reflection 
to form the first AcciMap (Version 1; V1). This allowed visualisation of multiple tasks 
and responsibility levels on a single map, creating a preliminary framework. 
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Where no documents were available, data were collected by interview to describe 
task activities starting with the first blue light responder arriving on scene and 
working upwards through the chains of command to detail the hierarchy, 
responsibilities, capabilities and resources for the STS. Field notes were recorded 
during the interview, transcribed and validated by the interviewees (member checked) 
for integration into the maps. These data were used to develop V1 mapping with 
tasks allocated to hierarchies and categories as with the document analysis.  
The V1 map was then reviewed with a participant from each stakeholder service 
(Fire, Ambulance, Police, and Military) exploring any differences between the written 
procedure (work as imagined) and actual procedures (work as done). The AcciMaps 
were amended following feedback to create version 2 (V2). This iterative process 
continued with AcciMaps sent for responder validation and feedback, until the 
AcciMap was signed off as an accurate representation of each service’s CBRN 
response.  
To create the harmonised consensus, the individual AcciMaps from each service 
were combined into a single AcciMap t  represent the CBRN response STS across 
the EU. Each individual AcciMap was compared and contrasted to look for 
similarities (rather than differences). The development of the consensus AcciMap 
aimed to have less detail to manage differences between services but to retain 
sufficient detail as a usable STS model. The same iterative procedure was followed 
with review, feedback and validation to all participants (n=5).  Every time the 
AcciMap was changed it was circulated to all participants to ensure that it retained 
validity for their individual service. This reduced the level of detail, for example tasks 
for triage and initial treatment can be undertaken by either Fire Service or a 
specialist Ambulance service depending on the territory, so the map does not assign 
tasks to one service. The EU AcciMap was validated by all participants as 
meaningful for their country.  
Results 
The essential tasks and operations of an EU CBRN response are shown as a 
harmonised (consensus) AcciMap (Figure 1) for the themes of Communication, 
Planning, Action, and Reflection. It was agreed that a similar structure of command 
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is used across the EU with some variation in terminology; Gold is often called 
‘Strategic’, and the terms ‘Tactical’, ‘Incident’,  and ‘Operational’ are used 
interchangeably to describe either Silver or Bronze levels, depending on country and 
service. A unified terminology was agreed as Gold/ Strategic Command, Silver/ 
Incident Command, Bronze/ On-Scene Command. These levels were followed by 
Specialist Blue Light Responders (S-BLR) and initial Blue Light Responders (BLR).  
Blue Light Responders are the conventional response individuals/ teams who 
respond to emergency calls. They are required to recognise that the scene may be a 
CBRN event and pass as much information as possible to control rooms so 
specialists (S-BLR), with CBRN response capabilities, can be dispatched. The level 
of training and personal protective equipment (PPE) will determine the tasks they 
can carry out. S-BLR, in these circumstances, are specially trained and equipped to 
react to CBRN events including triage; detecting, identifying and monitoring (DIM) 
the agent; casualty decontamination etc.  
The participating services agreed that the Bronze/ On-Scene Command carries out 
tasks to ensure that all resources (equipment and personnel) are used optimally by 
following the Incident Command Tactical Plan (T-Plan), and Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs). They manage the Operational Plan (O-Plan) which informs the 
tasks to be conducted by BLR and S-BLR.  
Silver/ Incident Command establishes, tracks and monitors the resources needed to 
perform an effective CBRN response as an on-going process throughout the incident. 
They are usually, but not always, located some way from the CBRN scene and have 
more of a systems (‘bigger picture’) perspective and will offer advice to the Bronze/ 
On-scene Command. They manage the Tactical Plan and communicate information 
up and down the STS, to reduce information overload for Gold and Bronze 
commands.  
The Gold/ Strategic Command is outward facing, managing the resources (regional, 
national and international) needed for the response. They are the point of contact 
with Government representatives and give or agree messages to the public, often ia 
the media. They instigate the Strategic Plan (S-Plan) based on policies, legal 
frameworks and protocols which is used by the Incident Commander (IC). Gold/ 
Strategic Command will consider mutual aid plans, environmental considerations 
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(containing run off, blocking drains etc.), evacuation of people and resources, utility 
shutdowns, and return to readiness (‘business as usual’). 
The Control Room/Dispatch activities are represented as a communication spine for 
transmitting information up/down the hierarchy. Most communication is by radio, with 
dedicated radio and wireless channels. There will often be a dedicated Major 
Incident Control Room (Con.Room) for each agency, with which all levels 
communicate for situation reports (Sit-Reps). Communication mostly takes place 
between adjacent levels. Bronze Command has continuous dialogue with S-BLR and 
BLR to give briefings and receive situation reports but will communicate with Gold 
Command only via Silver. 
All services have procedures to ensure equivalent level Commanders are co-located 
(face-to-face communication) as far as is reasonably practicable. This was reported 
to improve the joint situation u derstanding, situational awareness and decision-
making.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Fire services (BLR and S-BLR) are responsible for detecting, identifying and 
monitoring (DIM) hazards using a wide range of methods and equipment 
(technology). This information is used to determine cordons and zones, and 
communicated through the command levels to develop Strategic and Tactical Plans. 
In most EU territories Fire services usually lead for triage and evacuation of non-
ambulatory casualties from the Hot Zone; they are also responsible for mass 
decontamination of casualties, using improvised and specialist systems depending 
on the location and phase of the CBRN event and available resources. In the UK the 
Ambulance service is responsible for clinical triage in the Hot Zone. 
BLR tasks are supported or limited by the available equipment. Most Ambulance 
services (except UK) are not routinely supplied with Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE) which allows them to enter the Hot Zone, so pre-hospital care is mostly 
provided in the Cold Zone. Fire services usually carry higher specification PPE, 
including breathing apparatus, and will enter the Hot Zone to perform snatch rescues 
(‘heavers’) and initial reconnaissance.  
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Military resources and experts are used to provide support for CBRN response if 
required. They will be mobilised by Gold Command to increase the number of 
personnel and equipment to support DIM, triage, medical treatment, cordon control, 
mass decontamination and environmental protection/recovery, or if there is a 
requirement for specialist explosives capabilities (bomb disposal). It was found that 
Military CBRN CONOPs are well‐described but the level of detail does not 
necessarily translate to provide specific details for civilian CONOPS. The Military role 
was reported to be different across the EU, related to local political and cultural 
norms for involvement in civilian settings as well as CBRN resources and capabilities. 
As two of the participating services use the NATO (2015) guidelines to develop their 
operating procedures, the NATO guidelines are incorporated as follows:  
1. Information gathering, assessment and dissemination is carried out by BLR 
and S-BLR levels, ofte  by the Fire Service. Basic reconnaissance and DIM 
occurs as soon as possible depending on available equipment and PPE. The 
information is sent up the chain of command or to the Control Room for 
further dissemination. 
2. Scene management (isolated and controlled for the safety). This occurs at the 
BLR level with initial responders evacuating and securing the Hot Zone 
followed by the Police services taking charge of securing the area as soon as 
possible. DIM information is used by Fire Services to calculate the Hot, Warm 
and Cold Zone boundaries; it will be monitored throughout the incident for 
wind changes etc.  
3. Saving and protecting lives - effective methods for rescue, decontamination 
and medical treatment must be considered. This is done by BLR and S-BLR 
levels with snatch rescues, triage, treatment and decontamination. However, 
these tasks could be performed by difference services  
4. Specialist support. This occurs at both Silver and Gold levels where contact 
information for specialists in chemicals, biological agents, radiological 
substances, environmental clean-up etc. will be in place and can be activated 
if necessary.    
Opportunities for future technology development and evaluation were explored by 
locating specific technologies in individual sectors. For example, Fire service BLR 
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may routinely carry DIM equipment whereas S-BLR DIM equipment may be 
specifically designed for prolonged use in the Hot Zone. The usability requirements 
(design, portability and instructions for use) will change with operational 
circumstances so robust technology development and evaluation is needed to 
support an effective CBRN response. 
Discussion  
The international security expert community believe there is a growing probability for 
CBRN attacks (Steinhausler, 2015). Alexander and Klein (2006) stated ‘The reality of 
a CBRN event has to be accepted and, as a consequence, the authorities need to 
consider (and take seriously) how individuals and the community are likely to react.’ 
The process of mapping the cross-professional and cross-border CBRN responses 
confirmed similarities in the structures for command and control by the End Users in 
the (anonymised) project [I] (Greece, Finland, Czech Republic and UK). We believe 
that this is likely to be the first ever EU harmonised civilian CBRN systems 
(CONOPS). 
This civilian CONOPS has been described as an ‘abstract model % to describe how 
it intends to operate to achieve its goals and objectives. The CONOPS may be very 
high level and independent of the particular systems to be used in the organization 
or enterprise operations’ (ANSI/AIAA, 2012). While CONOPS are intended to 
describe detail and sequence for rescue in order that various stakeholders can know 
their role and contribution within a large dynamic scene where efforts must be 
coordinated (Mostashari et al, 2012). A large scale major CBRN incident may need 
cross-border and cross-professional engagement where efficient interoperability is 
vital and the results of this work suggest there are at least some commonalities in 
approach to dealing with such an incident across services and borders. This model 
brings to the attention of Emergency Service representatives where these 
commonalities lie and therefore where interoperability should be possible. If these 
commonalities are built upon and the STS developed further then interoperability 
could be prioritised and made more robust still. The model also allows those less 
familiar with CBRN response procedures, but who have an impact on them- such as 
technology developers, to better understand how the response will play out and 
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therefore optimise their technology to integrate more seamlessly within the current 
system- leading to an improved response for all. 
It has been suggested that developing an even more detailed CBRN response model 
may not necessarily be advisable; there is a ‘fallacy of developing all-inclusive 
doctrines and procedures to guide complex response. Extreme events occur 
infrequently, and no two are exactly the same. A comprehensive set of procedures to 
cover the space of possible events may be impossible to achieve’ (Mendonça et al., 
2007). We suggest that the overview model approach taken in this paper may be as 
specific as is advised or needed for mapping CBRN response, as more specific 
operating procedures may not be achievable. However, segments of activity have 
been identified within the consensus AcciMap and are being further developed for 
use in planning/specification research and technology development, including field 
technical exercises.  
It is acknowledged that the study has limitations in only featuring three EU countries 
(UK; Greece; and Finland). However, it received a very positive response when 
presented within the EU Community of Users in 2017 (https://www.securityresearch-
cou.eu/). Some caution should be used when generalising results and we 
recommend that further validation will be useful, as with most research. 
Conclusion 
A large scale major CBRN incident may need cross-border and cross-professional 
engagement where efficient interoperability is vital. This research is the first EU 
consensus of a sociotechnical system map for CONOPS. It supports future research 
for technology development to improve situational awareness and response 
capabilities e.g. detection and decontamination equipment design and use, 
communication, diagnosis and response technologies.       
<Insert acknowledgements here> 
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Table 1: Participants (n=5) 
Country Service Interviewees’ 
operating level 
AcciMap V1 
source 
UK Police Silver (previously 
Bronze and familiar 
with Gold) 
Interview 
UK National Ambulance 
Resilience Unit 
(NARU) 
Gold (previously 
Silver and Bronze) 
Documents 
UK Fire and Rescue 
Service (FRS) 
Gold (previously 
Silver and Bronze) 
Documents 
Finland Fire Service (SSAV) Gold (previously 
Silver and Bronze) 
Interview 
Greece Hellenic Ministry of 
Defence (HMOD) 
Gold (previously 
Silver and Bronze) 
Interview 
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Figure 1: EU CBRN consensus AcciMap (key for terms in annex) 
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Table 2: Glossary of terms used in the AcciMap 
Abbreviations/ acronyms Description 
BLR  Blue Light (First) Responder (Fire, Police, Ambulance) 
Bronze Command Operational or Scene Command(er) 
Cold Zone Area safe from contamination confined by inner and 
outer cordon 
Con.Room Control Room for communication 
Cordon Physical or figurative barrier (tape or other) to indicate 
where access may be restricted for safety reasons 
Decontamination Removal of substances from people, equipment or the 
environment.  
DIM Detection, Identification, Monitoring  
Gold Command Strategic Command  
IC Incident Command(er) – Silver Command 
OSC On Scene Command 
O-PLAN Operational PLAN 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
S-PLAN Strategic PLAN 
Silver Command Tactical or Incident Command(er) 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure1  
S-BLR Specialist Blue Light Response/Responder trained to 
deal with elements relating to CBRN.  
T-PLAN Tactical PLAN 
Triage Screening and prioritization of casualties based on 
severity of injuries 
Warm Zone Area not directly exposed to the substance but possible 
exposure from people and equipment not yet been 
decontaminated  
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